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ABSTRACT 
 Throughout history, citizens’ opinions of law enforcement have fluctuated 
between confidence and mistrust. This ebb and flow can coincide with many factors, such 
as historical events like 9/11, personal interaction with an officer, and media/social media 
reporting of the public’s encounters with police. A citizen’s confidence and trust in law 
enforcement may also differ based on the person’s gender, race, or socioeconomic status. 
Law enforcement has invested millions of dollars in research, new initiatives, equipment, 
and technology—such as body-worn cameras (BWCs)—to regain the public’s confidence 
and trust. Those who support BWCs suggest that their use corresponds with declining use 
of force and citizen complaints, which shows increased public trust in law enforcement. 
This paper seeks to determine, however, if these factors—use of force and citizen 
complaints—are the proper metrics for measuring law enforcement transparency, 
accountability, and citizen trust. This thesis provides a comparative analysis of the 
quantity and quality of BWC information that police departments make easily accessible 
to the public and provides a recommendation for law enforcement to develop and 
implement a BWC incident-based reporting system. 
v 
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Transparency, accountability, and trust are paramount to effective police–
community relations, as well as to democracy.1 Local law enforcement agencies rely on 
the public to report suspicious and dangerous activity, and citizens rely on law enforcement 
agencies for “participation, trust in government, prevention of corruption, informed 
decision-making, the accuracy of government information, and provision of information to 
the public, companies, and journalists, among other essential functions in society.”2 
Throughout history, citizens’ opinions of law enforcement have fluctuated between an 
abundance of confidence and mistrust. Since 2014, a series of police deadly force 
encounters have once again eroded trust and caused communities to question the actions 
and accountability of law enforcement. In response, law enforcement has invested millions 
of dollars in research, new initiatives, equipment, and technology to regain the public’s 
confidence and trust; body-worn cameras (BWCs) are one such recent attempt. Community 
leaders and chiefs of police believe BWCs reduce violent interactions during police and 
citizen encounters and improve agency transparency, accountability, and trust. This thesis 
does not examine if BWC technology itself affects these factors; the thesis is, instead, a 
comparative analysis of the amount, type, and consistency of BWC information that law 
enforcement makes available to the public. 
Transparency refers to the disclosure of, access to, and use of information by the 
public.3 Accountability is a complex concept that involves meeting a multitude of 
expectations—based on differing sets of norms from a variety of individuals or groups who 
                                                 
1 John Carlo Bertot, Paul T. Jaeger, and Justin M. Grimes, “Promoting Transparency and 
Accountability through ICTs, Social Media, and Collaborative E-government,” Transforming Government: 
People, Process and Policy 6, no. 1 (2012), https://www.doi.org/10.1108/17506161211214831. 
2 Bertot, Jaeger, and Grimes. 
3 Wendy Ginsberg et al., Government Transparency and Secrecy: An Examination of Meaning and its 
Use in the Executive Branch, CRS Report No. R42817 (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 
2012), 1. 
xvi 
may pass differing judgments.4 Trust, if developed and leveraged, has the potential to 
create unparalleled success and prosperity in every dimension of life; yet trust is “the least 
understood, most neglected, and most underestimated possibility of our time.”5 State and 
federal freedom of information laws and law enforcement accreditation standards provide 
a legal framework and some guidelines for the release of police BWC information and data 
to the public. The purpose of these laws and accreditation programs is to enhance 
transparency and implement consistent best practices; “inconsistent messages that occur 
anywhere in an organization” are “one of the fastest-moving destroyers of trust.”6 
This thesis compares five police departments that participate in law enforcement 
accreditation programs and are located in jurisdictions with liberal freedom of information 
laws. The analysis shows inconsistencies in the type and amount of BWC information these 
departments provide to the public. To mitigate inconstancies, the thesis ultimately 
recommends that law enforcement agencies develop a BWC incident-based reporting 
system similar to the existing National Incident-Based Reporting System (NIBRS). The 
conclusion further recommends that the District of Columbia’s current BWC program and 
reporting requirements be examined and considered as the model for other agencies. 
  
                                                 
4 Mark Bovens, Thomas Schillemans, and Robert E. Goodin, “Public Accountability,” in The Oxford 
Handbook of Public Accountability, ed. Mark Bovens, Robert E. Goodin, and Thomas Schillemans (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 2014), http://www.oxfordhandbooks.com/view/10.1093/oxfordhb/ 
9780199641253.001.0001/oxfordhb-9780199641253-e-012?result=1&rskey=AU2QmP. 
5 Stephen M. R. Covey and Rebecca R. Merrill, The Speed of Trust: The One Thing That Changes 
Everything (New York: Free Press, 2008), 1. 
6 Robert M. Gladford and Anne Seibold-Drapeau, “The Enemies of Trust,” Harvard Business Review, 
August 1, 2014, https://hbr.org/2003/02/the-enemies-of-trust. 
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Transparency, accountability, and trust are paramount to effective police–
community relations. Since 2014, a series of police deadly force encounters have eroded 
this trust and caused communities to question the actions and accountability of law 
enforcement. According to a survey conducted by the Pew Research Center in 2016, the 
public and law enforcement have contrasting views about the deaths of African Americans 
during encounters with police.1 Specifically, the study found that “67% of the police but 
only 39% of the public describe these deadly encounters as isolated incidents rather than 
signs of a broader problem between blacks and police.”2 These deadly encounters and 
discord between the police and the public have led police departments across the nation to 
implement body-worn camera (BWC) programs to help improve police–community 
relations. Indeed, the Pew Research study also reports “that majorities of the police and 
public favor the use of body cameras by officers to record interactions with the public.”3 
Local law enforcement agencies rely on the public to report suspicious and 
dangerous activity. Every day, the media reports examples of citizen engagement and tips 
that help law enforcement catch criminals or prevent crime. In November 2017, for 
example, “a tip called in to police led to the capture of the man wanted in the shooting 
deaths of three people at a suburban Denver Walmart.”4 According to the Orlando Sentinel, 
citizen engagement and tips are so important to homeland security that “law enforcement 
has made reporting suspicious activity as easy as pushing a button.”5 The National 
Sheriff’s Association agrees and has collaborated with the National Fusion Center and the 
                                                 




4 Erik Ortiz, “Police Arrest Suspect Wanted in Killing of 3 at a Colorado Walmart,” NBC News, 
November 2, 2017, https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/gunman-kills-3-walmart-thornton-colorado-
n816746. 
5 Caitlin Doornbos, “With New App, Citizens Can Report Terrorism with the Push of a Button,” 
Orlando Sentinel, May 30, 2017, https://www.orlandosentinel.com/news/crime/os-terrorism-tips-app-
20170525-story.html. 
2 
Department of Homeland Security to develop the BlackBox digital reporting app.6 
According to the BlackBox developer, citizens can download the app on their smartphones 
and then upload video, audio, and GPS coordinates to a secure cloud server. Once all 
information has been uploaded, the local police department receives a text message or 
email about the situation.7 
Unfortunately, even with law enforcement community initiatives and the use of 
technology, police–community relations have still experienced periods of disharmony. 
Smartphones, citizen journalists, real-time video, and the use of social media are 
restructuring the public’s view of modern-day policing. Police respond to emergency and 
non-emergency calls for service—and the public is watching. When the officer arrives on 
the scene, bystanders record the police–citizen encounter with their smartphones. The 
onlooker can upload the recording to social media or provide it to mainstream media for 
distribution. The video may or may not contain audio but almost always contains 
commentary describing what the viewer should glean from the video.  
The officer-involved deaths of Eric Garner, John Crawford, Michael Brown, 
Laquan McDonald, Akai Gurley, and Tamir Rice in 2014 sparked outcry, fueled mistrust, 
and hurt police–community relations. All six men were African American and all but one 
death was recorded by bystanders. Grand juries were convened to review each of these 
deaths and, with the exception of Gurley’s case, none of the officers involved were 
indicted.8 In the Gurley case, Officer Peter Liang was indicted for manslaughter and 
sentenced to five years of probation and 800 hours of community service. Overall, 
however, the lack of indictments for the police officers involved in the other deaths 
prompted anti-police protests throughout the country.9 During the demonstrations, 
                                                 
6 Doornbos.  
7 BlackBox, accessed September 28, 2018, http://www.iceblackbox.com/. 
8 Kathleen M. O’Reilly, “Transparency, Accountability, and Engagement: A Recipe for Building Trust 
in Policing” (master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2017), 1. 
9 O’Reilly, 1 
3 
protestors chanted phrases threatening law enforcement officers, such as “What do we 
want? Dead cops! When do we want them? Now!”10  
“These events initiated a national interest in equipping law enforcement officers 
with body-worn cameras,” and political discussions began, up to the level of the White 
House.11 These discussions led to federal grant funding to help police departments 
implement BWCs as one initiative to increase police transparency and accountability. By 
2015, “the Justice Department had awarded grants totaling more than $23.2 million to 73 
local and tribal agencies in 32 states to expand the use of body-worn cameras and explore 
their impact.”12 This thesis seeks to contribute to the body of knowledge and conceptual 
debate surrounding BWCs and their intended purposes as defined by the U.S. Department 
of Justice’s Office of Community Oriented Policing (COP), the Police Executive Research 
Forum (PERF), law enforcement practitioners, and community members.  
Since 2014, industry experts, academics, and law enforcement organizations have 
been conducting endless research studies, collecting and analyzing BWC data. The 
National Institute of Justice funded a CNA Corporation study that examined the impact of 
body-worn cameras in the Las Vegas Metro Police Department in 2013, and a 2014 study 
conducted by the Los Angeles Police Foundation evaluated BWC video technology in the 
Los Angeles Police Department.13 In 2016 and 2017, respectively, the University of South 
Florida publish a report on the Orlando Police Department’s yearlong BWC pilot program 
and the San Diego Police Department published the findings of its BWC study.14 These 
                                                 
10 O’Reilly, 1 
11 Giacomo Sacca, “Not Just Another Piece of Equipment: An Analysis for Police Body-Worn 
Camera Policy Decisions” (master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2017), 1. 
12 “Justice Department Awards over $23 Million in Funding for Body Worn Camera Pilot Program to 
Support Law Enforcement Agencies in 32 States,” Department of Justice, November 10, 2016, 
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-awards-over-23-million-funding-body-worn-camera-
pilot-program-support-law. 
13 “Research on Body-Worn Cameras and Law Enforcement,” National Institute of Justice, December 
5, 2017, https://www.nij.gov/topics/law-enforcement/technology/pages/body-worn-cameras.aspx. 
14 Nick Wing, “Study Shows Less Violence, Fewer Complaints When Cops Wear Body Cameras,” 
Huffington Post, December 19, 2016, https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/police-body-camera-
study_us_561d2ea1e4b028dd7ea53a56; David Garrick, “San Diego Police Body Cameras Reducing 
Misconduct, Aggressive Use of Force, Report Says,” Los Angeles Times, February 10, 2017, 
http://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me-san-diego-body-cameras-20170210-story.html. 
4 
studies and reports yielded findings similar to those of other studies, which have found that 
BWC technology provides objective and indisputable evidence of an incident, and lends 
clarity and accuracy to the event record.15 As such, community leaders and chiefs of police 
believe BWCs reduce violent interactions during police and citizen encounters.16 Other 
supporters of BWCs believe the technology provides additional law enforcement–related 
benefits. Ronald L. Davis notes: “Law enforcement agencies are using body-worn cameras 
in various ways: to improve evidence collection, to strengthen officer performance and 
accountability, to enhance agency transparency, to document encounters between police 
and the public, and to investigate and resolve complaints and officer involved incidents.”17  
The Office of the Press Secretary for the White House issued a BWC fact sheet in 
2014, noting that BWC technology and footage are acceptable metrics for measuring 
community trust and confidence in law enforcement.18 Some, but not all, police 
departments currently using BWCs do report a reduction in citizen complaints.19 The 
Metropolitan Police Department (MPD) in Washington, DC, in its BWC study, found “no 
discernible impact on citizen complaints or officers’ use of force.”20 Researcher Anita 
Ravishankar of the MPD reported, “We found essentially that we could not detect any 
statistically significant effect of the body-worn cameras.”21 MPD Chief of Police Peter 
Newsham said that he was surprised by the results of the study, adding that “a lot of people 
were suggesting that the body-worn cameras would change behavior; however, there was 
                                                 
15 “Strengthening Community Policing,” White House, December 1, 2014, https://obamawhitehouse. 
archives.gov/the-press-office/2014/12/01/fact-sheet-strengthening-community-policing. 
16 White House. 
17 Lindsay Miller and Jessica Toliver, Implementing a Body-Worn Camera Program: 
Recommendations and Lessons Learned, Community Oriented Policing Services (Washington, DC: 
Department of Justice, 2014), vii, https://ric-zai-inc.com/ric.php?page=detail&id=COPS-P296. 
18 White House, “Strengthening Community Policing.” 
19 White House. 
20 Nell Greenfieldboyce, “Body Cam Study Shows No Effect on Police Use of Force or Citizen 




no indication that the cameras changed behavior at all.”22 Dr. Michael White of Arizona 
State University, an expert in police use of BWCs, suggests that MPD’s BWC results are 
to be expected because MPD experienced “a decade of federal oversight to help improve 
the department”; White continues: “They’re hiring the right people; they’ve got good 
training; they’ve got good supervision; they’ve got good accountability mechanisms in 
place.”23 A department that has those types of procedures in place, White says, will not 
likely see a large reduction in complaints against personnel or uses of force because the 
procedures are working.24  
A. RESEARCH QUESTION 
This thesis does not examine if BWC technology itself impacts transparency, 
accountability, and trust—this has been examined countless times. Instead, this thesis 
examines the amount, type, and consistency of BWC information and data that law 
enforcement makes available to the public. The thesis also examines if there is consistency 
among law enforcement agencies in the amount and types of BWC information and data 
released to the public, what methods police departments employ to release BWC 
information/data, and how easily accessible that information is to the public. Furthermore, 
this study seeks to determine if the quantity and quality of BWC information and data 
offered by departments meets established transparency metrics. Lastly, the thesis 
specifically asks: Has law enforcement agencies’ implementation of BWCs and release of 
BWC information/data met its intended purpose of improving community trust by 
increasing police transparency and accountability? 
B. LITERATURE REVIEW 
In its final report, the President’s Task Force on 21st Century Policing identifies 
several pillars essential for developing and sustaining police–community trust and 
collaboration. Pillar 1 begins with “building trust and nurturing legitimacy on both sides 





of the police-citizen divide is the foundational principle underlying the nature of relations 
between law enforcement agencies and the communities they serve.”25 John Carlo Bertot, 
Paul T. Jaeger, and Justin M. Grimes assert that transparency and accountability are core 
components of trust.26 As noted by these experts, the national focus has transitioned to a 
need for government openness through transparency—a need for public access to 
government information.  
Bertot et al. also believe that transparency and accountability are crucial functions 
of democracy; these functions include “participation, trust in government, prevention of 
corruption, informed decision-making, the accuracy of government information, and 
provision of information to the public, companies, and journalists, among other essential 
functions in society.”27 Federal, state, and local police organizations are subsections of 
government. As such, Bertot et al. believe that police departments that have established a 
culture of transparency and accountability stand a greater chance of gaining public trust.  
C. DEFINITIONS 
Advocates of BWCs believe that BWC technology offers transparency and 
accountability. Law enforcement leadership and BWC supporters believe that transparency 
and accountability lead to trust, and trust in turn leads to a reduction in both citizen 
complaints and uses of force by officers. One key hurdle for law enforcement and 
communities to overcome is a lack of mutual understanding for the terms trust, 
transparency, and accountability. This section offers industry definitions of these terms 
and attempts to establish how transparency and accountability lead to public trust.  
                                                 
25 President’s Task Force on 21st Century Policing, Final Report of the President’s Task Force on 
21st Century Policing (Washington, DC: Office of Community Oriented Policing Services., 2015), iii, 
https://cops.usdoj.gov/pdf/taskforce/taskforce_finalreport.pdf. 
26 John Carlo Bertot, Paul T. Jaeger, and Justin M. Grimes, “Promoting Transparency and 
Accountability through ICTs, Social Media, and Collaborative E-government,” Transforming Government: 
People, Process and Policy 6, no. 1 (2012), https://www.doi.org/10.1108/17506161211214831. 
27 Bertot, Jaeger, and Grimes. 
7 
1. Transparency 
The Congressional Research Service defines transparency as the disclosure of, 
access to, and use of information by the public,” and transparency supporters sometimes 
tout that more transparency is better. However, full disclosure of information poses 
challenges for law enforcement, as police departments are bound by privacy laws codifying 
what and when information may and may not be disclosed.28 Jenny de Fine Licht, citing 
Mansbridge, “suggests that full transparency may not the best practice in policy making.”29 
Licht further suggests that “a limited amount of transparency that focuses on decision 
makers providing reasons for their choices can be a good alternative when transparency 
may have costs, such as preventing decision makers from acting in an effective way.”30 
Ben Brucato credits Jeremy Bentham, an eighteenth-century utilitarian, as the first 
person to use the term transparency as it relates to public officials and accountability.31 
Bentham believed that “transparency and accountability were equally important in … 
administration,” and he described transparency and accountability as “devices to ensure 
the maximization of intellectual, moral, and active aptitude in public officials.”32 
Following Bentham’s philosophy, Brucato writes that transparency encourages 
“governments and their agents to make themselves visible to their publics via self-
disclosure.”33 Brucato further states that “police are not immune from the expectation that, 
as an agency of government, they should publicly disclose their activities.”34  
                                                 
28 Wendy Ginsberg et al., Government Transparency and Secrecy: An Examination of Meaning and 
its Use in the Executive Branch, CRS Report No. R42817 (Washington, DC: Congressional Research 
Service, 2012), 1. 
29 Jenny de Fine Licht, “Transparency Actually: How Transparency Affects Public Perceptions of 
Political Decision-Making,” European Political Science Review 6, no. 2 (2014): 309–330, 
https://doi.org/10.1017/S1755773913000131. 
30 Licht, 6. 
31 Ben Brucato, “Big Data and the New Transparency: Measuring and Representing Police Killings,” 
Big Data & Society 4, no. 1 (June 2017): 1–5, https://doi.org/10.1177/2053951717696332. 
32 James E. Crimmins, “Jeremy Bentham,” Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, February 1, 2017, 
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/bentham/. 
33 Brucato, “Big Data and the New Transparency,” 1. 
34 Brucato, 2. 
8 
The United States Department of Justice (DOJ) provides a historical perspective on 
the public’s right to access information from the government. DOJ reminds us that the 
“assurances of open government exist in the common law, in the first state laws after 
colonization, in territorial laws in the west and even in state constitutions.”35 DOJ further 
explains that “the basic function of the Freedom of Information Act is to ensure informed 
citizens, vital to the functioning of a democratic society.”36 Open-access laws are not just 
limited to the federal government. All states have passed laws requiring state and local 
governments to make information available to citizens upon request. State laws further 
provide citizens open access to government proceedings. According to DOJ, many of these 
laws were written “in direct response to the scandals spawned by government secrecy.”37 
Monika Bauhr and Marcia Grimes’s research found that organizations that lack a 
strong internal audit system and do not permit citizens to provide input or express 
grievances in the process are not transparent organizations.38 Even when organizations go 
to great lengths to make information publicly accessible, they concluded, citizens’ may 
lack the capacity to act on the information. Their research, with contribution from Niklas 
Harring, shows that “increasing transparency does not provide a simple lever to pull in 
order to cultivate trust in public institutions.”39 Bauhr and Grimes further state that the 
government’s 
concept of transparency contains a host of contested issues including: where 
to draw the line between the principles of transparency and national 
security, individual integrity, and corporations’ desire for nondisclosure; 
whether government offices must publish information proactively or simply 
provide information upon request; who should incur the cost of information 
provision (public offices versus those seeking access); whether access to 
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information is sufficient and meaningful absent conditions such as an 
independent and investigative media, and institutional arrangements for 
redressing abuses once brought to light.40 
They insist that “a key component of the definition is the emphasis, not only on the 
provision of information, but also the ability of external actors to demand and gain access 
to information not provided routinely by political and administrative institutions,” 
including agent (government)-controlled transparency but also, importantly, non-agent-
controlled transparency.41  
Catharina Lindstedt and Daniel Naurin define non-agent-controlled transparency as 
the use of information by non-government organizations, the media, and citizens.42 Bauhr 
and Grimes believe that three principal dimensions (government openness, whistleblower 
protection, and publicity) offer a metric by which to measure transparency.43 Bauhr and 
Grimes do not simply subscribe to the notion that the establishment and/or enforcement of 
strong open-access legislation is the sole proper metric for transparency research. They 
conclude that “transparency, despite a surge of attention in policy and academic arenas, 
has received insufficient, rigorous theoretical attention and therefore remains somewhat 
shrouded in conceptual ambiguity.”44 Bauhr and Grimes’s research provides initial support 
for the principal-agent model of transparency.45 In this model, “transparency is used by 
the principal to monitor the agent, rather than a more normatively oriented model of 
transparency in which transparency reforms signal a commitment to improve government 
institutions and thereby increase trust and confidence that the government will deal with 
its problems internally.”46 They further explain that “logic of principal agent theory 
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suggests that because the interests of agents and principals may diverge, principals must 
find ways of monitoring the actions taken by agents.”47 
H. J. M. (Erna) Ruijer sought to understand how government communicators 
identify preemptive transparency and how those observations influence the way the 
government implements proactive transparency practices48. Ruijer’s research addresses 
the transparency literature’s constant notion that “an automatic link is assumed from 
transparency to increased accountability or trust.”49 Ruijer’s study moves the focus from 
the public’s access to data and the readiness of data to communication approaches to 
government transparency, and addresses data access, information sharing, and the intended 
audience of information. This study is particularly interesting because Ruijer states—as the 
author of this thesis has also experienced in her thirty-four years of policing—that law 
enforcement executive and/or government communicators still know very little about how 
to perceive and implement transparency initiatives. Ruijer stresses that, unless disclosed 
information can be analyzed, understood, and tracked by the receiver, it may not satisfy 
what the public needs to trust the government. Information is accountable, according to 
Ruijer, if it is balanced and forthcoming, if it acknowledges errors, and if it is open to 
censure or disapproval.50  
Ruijer’s research is relevant because law enforcement executives are often their 
own communications officials and are responsible for the timely and accurate release of 
information to the public. Ruijer’s findings reveal that government communicators who 
proactively recognize that transparency is essential will disclose considerably more 
relevant and accountable data regarding the internal workings of their agency.51 
Furthermore, Ruijer believes that government officials can improve transparency by 
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providing relevant, understandable, and more accessible information to the public. Her 
study finds that effective communicators anticipate and project stakeholders’ opinions and 
questions before the organization makes decisions. Ruijer’s study also provides some 
empirical support that communicators, at times, deliberately withhold information or do 
not provide the whole story—or that they may highlight positive information more than 
negative information. Ruijer concludes that framing or emphasizing (withholding or 
highlighting) information can cause confusion as the receiver assesses the organization’s 
transparency and secrecy.52 Ruijer’s findings are reflected in Figure 1.
                                                 
52 Ruijer, 359. 
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Figure 1. Proactive Government Communicators59
                                                 
59 Source: Ruijer, 359. 
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Ruijer’s research shows that an organization’s commitment and support are 
stronger predictors for transparency, although the perceptions of communication officials 
are also an important factor.60 Ruijer states that “government communicators will provide 
substantial and accountable information, and are less likely to use spin techniques” in 
organizations that are supportive of proactive transparency.61 Ruijer further concludes that 
when organizations are supportive, their government communicators are more likely to ask 
stakeholders to participate in mutual dialogue and request their feedback. She concludes 
that organization support is important to employees. As Ruijer’s study reveals, “An 
organization that supports proactive transparency helps in reaping the benefits but also in 
managing the possible harms of communication.”62  
2. Accountability 
Accountability can mean different things to different people and can be perceived 
as negative or positive. Jeffrey Morgan writes that accountability works in conjunction 
with goals, objectives, consequences, and the expectation of continuous improvement.63 
Mark Bovens agrees, noting that accountability can be an effective tool but that it does not 
exist in a vacuum.64 He summarizes accountability as a complex concept that involves 
meeting a multitude of expectations, based on differing sets of norms from a variety of 
individuals or groups.65 Barbara S. Romzek and Melvin J. Dubnick agree, stating that 
“public administration accountability involves the means by which public agencies and 
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their workers manage the diverse expectations generated within and outside of an 
organization.”66  
In politics and the government—including law enforcement—accountability is an 
important facet of a leader’s professional life. Bovens writes, “Public managers, especially 
those with a professional or legal background, often find political accountability difficult 
to handle, if not threatening, because of the fluid, contingent, and ambiguous character of 
political agendas.”67 Bovens is somewhat critical, arguing that accountability, particularly 
in the public realm, can be used as a scheme for blaming. He explains that accountability 
involves responsibility, which also means shouldering the blame should something go awry 
or if the responsible individual’s conduct breaches the norm—and norms are sometimes 
deliberately vague and convoluted, or established after the fact.68 For law enforcement 
leaders, this terrain may be challenging; law enforcement leaders must answer to boards of 
directors, city and county managers, and the public, all of which have differing norms and 
expectations.  
However, many law enforcement leaders across the nation are steadfast, and do not 
tolerate unethical and corrupt acts among their forces. For example, in September 2018 
Police Chief James Craig immediately suspended a rookie police officer without pay for 
an offensive Snapchat and Facebook post in which the officer referred to citizens as “zoo 
animals.”69 The officer was subsequently terminated. Afterward, Chief Craig noted, “We 
emphasize in the academy: integrity and service to community; when we make a statement 
like this, what’s the message?”70 In January of 2018, Fairfax County Police Chief Edwin 
Roessler released a dashboard camera video of a Fairfax officer who assisted in a United 
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States Park Police vehicle pursuit, which ended when U.S. Park officers fatally shot and 
killed twenty-five-year-old Bijan Ghaisar of McLean, Virginia. Chief Roessler explained 
his reasoning for releasing the video: “As a matter of transparency to all in our community, 
especially the Ghaisar family, and as the administrative custodian of the video, I am 
releasing the in-car video of the U.S. Park Police shooting.”71 He continues, with reference 
to the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI): “The video does not provide all the answers; 
however, we should all have confidence in the FBI’s investigation of this matter as I know 
it will be thorough, objective and professional.”72 Reporting police misconduct and 
corruption extends beyond local and state police reporting. The FBI publishes press 
releases on its website of public corruption cases that it investigates.73 The information is 
available to the public through an open-source Internet search. Bovens also believes that 
transparency and accountability strengthens community trust and confidence in 
government and bridges discourse between the people and their representatives.74  
Sheldon Adelberg and C. Daniel Batson, though they agree about the importance 
of the concepts, note that excessive attention on accountability and transparency may result 
in weak or ineffective decision-making instead of improved organizational performance.75 
They designed a study to test how decision-makers would distribute limited college grant 
funding to students who met the formal grant requirements. One set of grant distributors 
was told that their decisions would be scrutinized and that they would have to account for 
their funding distribution decisions after the awards were made.76 The second set was not 
given any information regarding scrutiny of their decision-making. During the study, the 
first set tried to avoid risk, student dissatisfaction, or public criticism by giving each grant 
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applicant the same amount of money. The equal distribution of very small grants resulted 
in grant awards that were insufficient for any of students to continue their studies. The 
second set of grant distributors weighed options and made a conscious choice to award the 
grant money to the grant applicants who demonstrated most financial need. As a result, 
larger grant awards were distributed to fewer grant applicants; however, the grant awards 
were enough for those students to continue their education. Adelberg and Batson concluded 
that even though the second group was not specifically told they would be held 
accountable, the group still felt some measure of accountability, without undue pressure, 
which led them to make more efficient use of the grant funds. Adelberg and Batson further 
concluded that if leaders believe their accountability is going to be judged too severely, 
they are more likely to make decisions based on risk avoidance rather than data and facts.77  
3. Trust 
Stephen Covey and Rebecca Merrill explain the power of trust when they write:  
There is one thing that is common to every individual, relationship, team, 
family, organization, nation, economy, and civilization throughout the 
world—one thing which, if removed, will destroy the most powerful 
government, the most successful business, the most influential leadership, 
the greatest friendship, the strongest character, the deepest love…. On the 
other hand, if developed and leveraged, that one thing has the potential to 
create unparalleled success and prosperity in every dimension of life; yet, it 
is the least understood, most neglected, and most underestimated possibility 
of our time…. That one thing is trust.78 
Influential leaders acknowledge the power of trust and look for ways to measure it, yet few 
codify its meaning for mutual understanding. Covey and Merrill provide a simple 
definition: “[T]rust means confidence.”79 They also address the opposite of trust, distrust, 
emphasizing: “Distrust is suspicion.”80 
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Industry professionals agree that trust is essential between the public and 
government entities. In May 2017, the Pew Research Center published a study titled 
“Public Trust in Government: 1958–2017.” The opening paragraph of the report states: 
“Public trust in the government remains near historic lows.”81 The study found that “only 
20% of Americans today say they can trust the government in Washington to do what is 
right ‘just about always’ (4%) or ‘most of the time’ (16%).”82 The study provides historical 
references to events that have affected public trust in government, specifically references 
war, government scandals, and the economy as major influences; the report notes: “Trust 
in government began eroding during the 1960s, amid the escalation of the Vietnam War, 
and the decline continued in the 1970s with the Watergate scandal and worsening economic 
struggles.”83 The study does reference short periods of public confidence in the 
government, such as the late 1990s when the U.S. economy was growing, and a short-lived 
“three-decade high shortly after the 9/11 terrorist attacks.”84  
The Pew Research center also reported “a downward trajectory in trust in 
government … across racial and ethnic lines.”85 Historically, according to the report, 
minorities express a greater feeling of distrust in government, specifically in African 
American and Hispanic communities. The study found that minorities’ trust increases and 
decreases depending on which political party controls the presidency. “During the 
Republican presidencies of Reagan and G.W. Bush, more whites than blacks said they 
trusted the government to do the right thing. Conversely, during the Democratic 
administrations of Clinton and Obama blacks were more likely than whites to express trust 
in government.”86 
                                                 








In 2014, recognizing that trust between the police and the communities they serve 
is important, President Barack Obama appointed a task force to examine community–
police relations and to “identify best policing practices and offer recommendations on how 
those practices can promote effective crime reduction while building public trust.”87 The 
first sentence of the President’s Task Force on 21st Century Policing specifically states: 
“Trust between law enforcement agencies and the people they protect and serve is essential 
in a democracy.”88 The report goes on to provide numerous recommendations, categorized 
into six main topics or “pillars,” the three most relevant of which are Pillars One, Two, and 
Three.89 The first pillar, “Building Trust and Legitimacy,” describes how years of research 
support the idea that citizen will obey laws when they have faith in those who are enforcing 
the laws. The public will confer authority on those they believe are performing in an 
unbiased and fair manner. The report found that “law enforcement cannot build community 
trust if it is seen as an occupying force coming in from outside to impose control on the 
community.”90 The report recommends establishing a policing environment with a 
foundation of transparency and accountability. 
The second pillar, “Policy and Oversight,” emphasizes that “if police are to carry 
out their responsibilities according to established policies, those policies must reflect 
community values.”91 Under this pillar, the task force recommends that law enforcement 
agencies “develop policies and strategies for deploying resources that aim to reduce crime 
by improving relationships, increasing community engagement, and fostering 
cooperation.”92 Pillar Two encourages community input in the development of law 
enforcement; however, agencies will need to define engagement and input with the goal of 
educating the community about appropriate police responses to “use of force (including 
training on the importance of de-escalation), mass demonstrations (including the 
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appropriate use of equipment, particularly rifles and armored personnel carriers), consent 
before searches, gender identification, racial profiling, and performance measures.”93 
Encouraging community input during policy development will also educate citizens about 
police tactics and the types of equipment that law enforcement officers use when 
responding to incidents.  
The third pillar, “Technology and Social Media,” finds that “the use of technology 
can improve policing practices and build community trust.”94 Implementing new 
technology, such as BWCs, the report suggests, will give police agencies the chance to 
involve the public in discussions about expectations for transparency, accountability, and 
privacy.95 The report does caution that technology, when implemented without well-
defined goals, a proper policy framework, and built-in privacy protections may negatively 
affect transparency, accountability, and trust.96 For police agencies considering 
implementing BWC programs, the task force recommends adopting the Bureau of Justice 
Assistance Body-Worn Camera Toolkit as a guide.97  
D. HYPOTHESIS 
Transparency and accountability are trumpeted by government officials and law 
enforcement leadership as vital to gaining and maintaining public trust. My hypothesis is 
that if government presents itself as open, explains to the people what and how decisions 
are made, and then provides the results of those decisions, citizens will feel trust in 
government; however, the relationship between transparency, accountability, and trust may 
not be as straightforward as advocates would profess. In fact, transparency and over-
reliance on accountability may decrease trust. 
As previous research has found, some police departments that use BWCs have seen 
fewer uses of force and fewer complaints from citizens against officers. This thesis asks: 
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Is simply measuring uses of force and citizen complaints the appropriate metric for 
determining the success or failure of an agency’s BWC program, or whether a police 
department has attained transparency, accountability, and public trust? Transparency, 
accountability, and trust are three separate considerations that must be evaluated 
individually. BWC technology does record events for law enforcement, citizens, media, 
courts, and juries to review, frame, and interpret based on the reviewer’s individual 
cognitive bias, but relying solely on the deployment of BWC technology may not be the 
correct metric for measuring or assuring transparency, accountability, and trust.  
E. RESEARCH DESIGN 
This thesis presents a comparative analysis of BWC information and data that law 
enforcement agencies provide to their citizens. This study has begun with a discussion on 
public trust, and has established an understanding for the terms transparency, 
accountability, and trust, particularly as they relate to the implementation of BWCs. In 
subsequent chapters, the study examines the legal foundations that direct the release—or 
withholding—of information, and examines law enforcement commissioning entities and 
the professional standards for establishing policies and procedures specifically related to 
BWC data recording, analysis, and reporting. Next, the text reviews five law enforcement 
agencies located in states that require patrol officers to be equipped with BWCs, and that 
require law enforcement agencies to share BWC information with the public.  
The five police agencies’ BWC programs were researched through open sources, 
such as police department websites, civic and non-profit organizations’ resources, police 
department policies, and internal affairs records. The BWC information and data is used 
for a comparative analysis to discern the type, timeliness, relevance, and consistency of the 
information across the agencies. Ultimately, this helps to establish metrics for measuring 
transparency, accountability, and public trust.  
The research is limited to exploring if the type, quantity, quality and consistency of 
BWC data released to the public is meeting the intended purposes of facilitating police 
transparency, improving police accountability, and improving the community’s trust in law 
enforcement. This research does not focus on the legality or privacy concerns for the use 
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of BWCs. Additionally, this research does not conduct a monetary cost-benefit analysis or 
explore the methods in which BWC data have been stored by police departments. 
F. THESIS OUTLINE 
This chapter has described the importance of police–community relations and law 
enforcement’s need for public trust to effectively maintain safety and security. The chapter 
also provided the thesis research question and problem statement, followed by a literature 
review surrounding transparency, accountability, and trust as they relate to government and 
law enforcement in general. The literature review also established metrics for judging the 
effectiveness of government transparency, accountability, and trust. 
Chapter II provides the legal framework for law enforcement agencies that employ 
BWC technology. This chapter discusses state-mandated BWC laws, state and federal 
freedom of information laws, and law enforcement accreditation standards. The chapter 
also discusses law enforcement professional standards related to establishing BWC 
policies, procedures, data collection, and reporting. Chapter III discusses the type, amount, 
and relevance of BWC data gathered, analyzed, and reported to the public by each of the 
law enforcement agencies examined in the study. The chapter also discusses the public’s 
ease of access to the information. 
Chapter IV provides a comparative analysis of the BWC data and assesses the 
effectiveness and relevance of the departments’ BWC information as it relates to 
transparency, accountability, and building public trust. The chapter also identifies the 
benefits and challenges of information contained within or missing from the data. Finally, 
Chapter IV provides recommendations for increasing transparency and accountability 
between police departments and the communities they serve. 
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II. LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR BODY-WORN CAMERAS 
Law enforcement organizations across the nation have implemented BWCs to 
record police interactions with the community. As BWC programs expand, so do the 
considerations and conversations surrounding them. Law enforcement must consider 
which officers should be required to wear BWCs; the circumstances that warrant recording 
interactions with the public; how to classify, retain, and store the video recordings; how to 
use the recordings as evidence; and how to release BWC video and data. Initial BWC data 
assumes, and in some instances states, that BWC technology provides objective and 
indisputable evidence of an incident and lends clarity and accuracy to the event record. 
PERF suggests that police agencies that implement successful BWC programs will 
experience an increase in transparency and accountability and a decrease in uses of force 
and complaints against personnel.98 BWC manufacturers also argue that their technology 
offers transparency and accountability by providing video and audio documentation of 
police–community interactions. The COPS and PERF 2014 BWC fact sheet suggests that 
BWC technology and video footage are acceptable metrics for measuring community trust 
and confidence, as well as law enforcement transparency and accountability.99 PERF’s 
exploratory survey found that “the number one reason why police departments choose to 
implement body-worn cameras is to provide a more accurate documentation of police 
encounters with the public.”100  
However, neither the accuracy of the video footage recorded by BWCs nor the act 
of determining who is accountable based on the video footage are the focus of this chapter. 
This chapter also does not focus on whether BWC technology reduces citizen complaints 
against law enforcement officers or prevents use-of-force incidents; these topics have 
already been examined through other comprehensive studies, including a 2017 Center for 
Naval Analyses study on the Las Vegas Metro Police, which concluded that BWC 
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technology is associated with “significant reductions in complaints of police misconduct 
and police use of force incidents.”101 Conversely, in 2017 The Lab @ DC—a team of 
researchers and data scientists based in the Office of the City Administrator in 
Washington, DC—published contradictory findings; its study “failed to detect any 
statistically significant effects of BWC on reducing citizen complaints or uses of force by 
officers.”102 The Lab @ DC further recommended that “law enforcement agencies that are 
considering adopting BWCs should not expect dramatic reductions in use of force or 
complaints, or other large-scale shifts in police behavior, solely from the deployment of 
this technology.”103  
This chapter concentrates, instead, on the legal frameworks that guides BWC use, 
implementation, and policies, along with the release of BWC information to the public. 
This chapter also examines law enforcement professional standards and accreditation, 
specifically the mandates concerning BWC audio and video recording that law 
enforcement agencies must meet if they want to be accredited. Privacy advocates and the 
Electronic Privacy Information Center (EPIC) have expressed concerns that BWCs could 
“become the next surveillance technology disproportionately aimed at the most 
marginalized members of society.”104 However, the American Civil Liberties Union 
(ACLU), a leading civil rights advocate, believes that monitoring law enforcement 
behavior can be helpful. The ACLU has publicly stated that they “accept body cameras if 
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they are deployed with strong policies, despite the fact that they are government cameras 
with a very real potential to invade privacy.”105  
A. STATE BWC LEGISLATION AND POLICIES  
Police departments—along with federal, state, and local representatives—have 
attempted to address concerns with BWCs by enacting legislation. Law enforcement 
associations and government organizations such as the International Association of Chief 
of Police (IACP), Major Cities Chief Association, the Police Executive Research Forum 
(PERF), and the Bureau of Justice Assistance have developed guidelines, model policies, 
and other resources to help police departments formulate BWC policies. As I was 
reviewing BWC policies for this thesis, I discovered that BWC policies can significantly 
differ from one police department to another. Some policies discuss the features and 
functions of BWC systems and provide specific guidance for BWC operations during 
routine and critical situations. Other departments have implemented vague BWC policies 
that provide limited guidance beyond explaining which officers are required to wear the 
cameras and under what circumstances they should be activated. There are even police 
departments that have implemented BWC programs but have yet to establish policies.  
State legislation also attempts to address areas of concern from non-governmental 
organizations and the public. These laws provide police departments with specific criteria 
to address in BWC policies. The legislation directs BWC video retention and provides 
video release guidelines that align with state Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) laws.  
The bi-partisan nongovernmental organization National Conference of State 
Legislatures (NCSL) was established in 1975 to serve the state legislatures members and 
staffs in the United States (including commonwealths and territories).106 “The NCSL has 
three objectives: to improve the quality and effectiveness of state legislatures; to promote 
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policy innovation and communication among state legislatures; and to ensure state 
legislatures a strong, cohesive voice in the federal system.”107 The NCSL maintains an 
active database dedicated to current BWC legislation; it was last updated on February 28, 
2018.108 According to the NCSL, “Body cameras continue to be a significant focus for 
state law makers as they consider and enact legislation to address police-community 
relations.”109 As of February 2018, thirty-four states and the District of Columbia have 
enacted laws relating to BWCs.110 The NCSL examines state laws to discern if the state 
has passed legislation that: 
1. Requires that certain police officers wear BWCs 
2. Requires written police policies for BWC programs 
3. Provides state funding to support BWC programs 
4. Has open-records laws111 
B. THE COMMISSION ON ACCREDITATION FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT 
AGENCIES (CALEA) 
In addition to examining state BWC legislation, I also researched law enforcement 
agencies that participate in accreditation programs. To be eligible for accreditation, a police 
department must meet explicit standards of excellence and must function according to best 
practices developed by public safety practitioners. The Commission on Accreditation for 
Law Enforcement Agencies (CALEA) has standards that specifically address BWCs.  
CALEA Standard 41.3.8, entitled “In-Car and/or Body-Worn Audio/Video,” 
mandates that participating law enforcement agencies with BWC programs must provide a 
written directive (policy) that addresses: 







• The purpose and organization philosophy regarding use 
• The requirements and restrictions for activation and deactivation of the 
device 
• Criminal and administrative use of camera captured data 
• Data storage and retention requirements 
• Equipment maintenance and inspection procedures 
• Training requirements for users and supervisors 
• Requirements for documented review of camera captured data including 
frequency and quantity112 
CALEA standards do not mandate the release of BWC information to the public. The 
release of BWC video footage and statistical information is guided or mandated by 
individual state statutes.  
Further, CALEA Standard 1.3.13 requires police agencies to conduct an annual 
analysis of the agency’s use-of-force activities. The analysis examines incidents of force 
to discern patterns or trends that could indicate the need for policy modifications, officer 
training, or additional equipment or equipment upgrades.113 Lastly, CALEA Standard 
52.1.5 requires police agencies to compile annual statistical summaries of internal affairs 
and use-of-force investigations, and to make these summaries available to the public and 
agency personnel.114 
C. CHALLENGES AFFECTING THE PUBLIC’S TRANSPARENCY, 
ACCOUNTABILITY, AND TRUST EXPECTATIONS  
Police departments must balance privacy with public accessibility to information—
which, in turn, affects transparency, at least in very broad strokes. As such, several 
considerations and laws dictate which information police may and may not release. 
                                                 




Denying a citizen’s request for information, even if legally, can produce transparency 
challenges for police agencies. 
Since 1967, the public has been able to access records from any federal agency by 
filing a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request.115 FOIA generally provides that “any 
person has the right to request access to federal agency records or information except to 
the extent the records are protected from disclosure by any of nine exemptions contained 
in the law or by one of three special law enforcement record exclusions.”116 The 
withholding of information to make a FOIA request is authorized. However, under the 
following nine exemption categories:  
• Classified information for national defense or foreign policy 
• Internal personnel rules and practices 
• Information that is exempt under other laws 
• trade secrets and confidential business information 
• Inter-agency or intra-agency memoranda or letters that are protected by 
legal privileges 
• Personnel and medical files 
• Law enforcement records or information 
• Information concerning bank supervision 
• Geological and geophysical information117 
Some law enforcement records and those pertaining to national security are provided 
special protections from FOIA requests.118 These protections are narrowly defined into 
three categories: 1) to protect ongoing criminal investigations, when the target is unaware 
that he or she is being investigated, or the investigation may be jeopardized by disclosure; 
                                                 
115 “The Freedom of Information Act,” Department of State, accessed November 5, 2017, 
https://foia.state.gov/Learn/FOIA.aspx. 
116 Department of State. 
117 Department of State.  
118 Department of State. 
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2) to protect the identity of informants; and 3) to protect FBI intelligence and terrorism 
investigations. Any records that fall within these three exclusions are not subject to release 
under requirements of the FOIA.119  
In addition to the FIOA, individual states also provide additional protections from 
FOIA requests. Some of these protections are for civil records like adoptions records, 
juvenile histories, and medical information.120 Other protections include the identity of 
victims in certain sexual assault cases and additional law enforcement records. The U.S. 
Department of State and state governments offer guides on using the FOIA to request 
government records; however, citizens and media still report frustration when attempting 
to receive information in a timely manner. 
Chapter III establishes the precise information and data that was examined for this 
thesis and asks specific questions regarding that data. The data examined and questions 
asked are based on the type of information state legislation and CALEA require law 
enforcement agencies to record and analyze.  
  
                                                 
119 Department of State. 
120 Department of State. 
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III. AGENCY DATA REPORTING 
The law enforcement agencies I chose to examine for this study are located in states 
that have met all four BWC categories established by the National Conference of State 
Legislators (NCSL), as described in Chapter II. As previously stated, the focus of this study 
is a comparative analysis of the quality, quantity, consistency, and relevance of BWC 
information and data released by police departments through their websites and Internet 
searches. Table 1 lists the states, sorted according to the four NCSL categories. The bolded 
states are those that fall within all four of the NCSL categories. 









    
California California California California 
Connecticut Colorado Connecticut Connecticut 
District of Columbia Connecticut District of Columbia District of Columbia 
Florida District of Columbia Florida Delaware 
Nevada Florida Georgia Florida 
South Carolina Illinois Illinois Illinois 
 Kentucky Kansas Kentucky 
 Massachusetts Louisiana Maryland 
 North Carolina Michigan Michigan 
 New Jersey Missouri Minnesota 
 Nevada North Carolina North Carolina 
 Pennsylvania North Dakota Nebraska 
 South Carolina New Hampshire New Hampshire 
 Texas Nevada Nevada 
  Oklahoma Oregon 
  Oregon Pennsylvania 
  Pennsylvania South Carolina 
  South Carolina Texas 
  Tennessee Utah 
  Texas Washington  
  Utah  
  Washington   
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Based on the report from the NCSL, there are five states and one district—California, 
Connecticut, Florida, Nevada, and South Carolina, plus the District of Columbia—that 
address all four NCSL categories. Next, the search criteria further narrowed to data from 
CALEA-accredited police departments operating within these areas. Lastly, police 
departments under consent decrees were also considered for this study, as consent decrees 
have mandatory reporting requirements. I found four CALEA-accredited police 
departments within the five states (see Table 2): the Bay Area Rapid Transit Police 
Department (BART), Cape Coral Police Department (CCPD), Las Vegas Metropolitan 
Police Department (LVMPD), and the City of Greenville Police Department (GPD). The 
Metropolitan Police Department (MPD) in Washington, DC, is also CALEA-accredited. 
None of the police departments in Connecticut both deploy BWCs and are CALEA-
accredited. 
Table 2. Accredited Law Enforcement Agencies Reviewed 
California  Connecticut DC Nevada Florida South Carolina 
      











I researched the police departments using open-source methods, agency websites, 
and the Internet in an attempt to answer the following questions: 
1. Does the police department post its BWC policy online or make the 
information readily available to the public? 
2. Are officers are required to wear and activate BWCs? 
3. Does the police department post BWC deployment information online or 
make the information readily available to the public? 
4. Does the police department post BWC technology failure information 
online or make the information readily available to the public? 
33 
5. Does the police department post data online, or make information readily 
available to the public, regarding the number of times officers have failed 
to turn on their BWCs? 
6. Does the police department post monthly, quarterly, or annual BWC 
statistical data regarding quality assurance review/audits online or make 
the information readily available to the public? 
7. Does the police department post the number of BWC FOIA requests and 
the disposition of those requests online or make the information readily 
available to the public? 
8. Does the police department release BWC video footage to the public or 
are BWC videos only released under special conditions? 
9. Does the police department complete annual use-of-force and complaints-
against-personnel reports? 
10. Does the police department post annual use-of-force and complaints-
against-personnel reports online or make the information readily available 
to the public? 
I examined the data for consistency and ease of access; I then tabulated and 
analyzed the results to determine if the police agencies are meeting the definitions of 
transparency and accountability set forth by the United States Government Accountability 




A. CALIFORNIA—BAY AREA RAPID TRANSIT POLICE DEPARTMENT 
According to BART’s website, “The BART Police Department is one of the first 
agencies in California to require all patrol officers and sergeants to wear a body 
camera.”121 BART police officers and sergeants began using BWCs in November 
2012.122 In June 2013, BART completed the implementation of its BWC program; today, 
all BART patrol officers and sergeants wear BWCs.123  
BART’s “Use of Axon Flex” policy is posted on the agency’s website.124 BART’s 
BWC policy includes guidance on the operation and activation of the BWCs and addresses 
video retention. BWC video in general is not released to the public; however, the public 
may obtain a video through a FOIA request. BART’s BWC policy also provides a provision 
for the chief of police to release BWC video at his her or her discretion. However, the 
policy lacks specific language relating to supervisory review and/or audits of BWC video 
for compliance or training purposes, and does not address CALEA’s requirements for 
“documented review of camera captured data including frequency and quantity.”125 
BART does publish data about complaints against personnel and uses of force on 
the agency website annually. The agency’s annual internal affairs reports for 2010 through 
2016 are posted online and are available to the public for review. The reports include 
“statistical data compiled by BART PD Office of Internal Affairs, addressing the number 
and nature of misconduct allegations resulting from both Citizen Issues and Administrative 
Investigations.”126 In addition, the reports compute agency use-of-force data. BART’s 
website does not provide specific BWC statistical data.  
                                                 
121 “BART Police Department Report,” Bay Area Rapid Transit Police (BART), October 16, 2017, 
https://www.bart.gov/sites/default/files/docs/BART%20Police%20AR%2010_16_17.pdf. 
122 BART. 
123 BART, 10. 
124 See https://www.bart.gov/about/police/reports. 
125 “PowerDMS,” CALEA, accessed November 24, 2017, https://powerdms.com/assessments/ 
1546/node/4265287?tooltabid=Tasks. 
126 “BART’s Focused Approach to Addressing the Homeless Crisis,” BART, accessed July 21, 2017, 
https://www.bart.gov/about/police/reports. 
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B. CONNECTICUT—LAW ENFORCEMENT DATA NOT AVAILABLE 
The NCSL reports that “Connecticut (HB 7103) (2015) requires the Commissioner 
of Emergency Services and Public Protection and the Police Officer Standards and 
Training Council to set minimum specifications for body-worn cameras.”127 HB 7103 
further mandates that the Office of Policy and Management provide grants to police 
departments in Connecticut to purchase BWCs and to provide digital data storage for those 
devices.  
According to CALEA’s database, there are currently twenty-four CALEA-
accredited police agencies in Connecticut, as shown in Table 3. Of those twenty-four 
agencies, only four are in the process of implementing BWC programs; three are in their 
infancy or in pilot-program stage. None of the four agencies post their BWC policies or 
information online or make the policy or information easily accessible to the public. 
Table 3. CALEA-Accredited Agencies in Connecticut 
Avon Police Department Berlin Police Department 
Bethel Police Department Bloomfield Police Department 
Connecticut State Police Connecticut State Capitol Police 
Coventry Police Department East Hartford Police Department 
East Haven Police Department Enfield Police Department 
Farmington Police Department Glastonbury Police Department 
Granby Police Department Guilford Police Department 
Madison Police Department Manchester Police Department 
Milford Police Department New Canaan Police Department 
North Haven Police Department Norwalk Police Department 
Rocky Hill Police Department Simsbury Police Department 
Wethersfield Police Department Willimantic Police Department 
 
                                                 
127 Information and quote obtained from the 2017 NCSL Body-Worn Camera Database. 
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C. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA—METROPOLITAN POLICE 
DEPARTMENT 
According to MPD’s 2016 annual report, MPD began its BWC pilot program in 
October 2014 and fully implemented the program in 2016.128 As stated on the agency’s 
website, MPD has issued approximately 2,800 BWCs to its patrol officers.129 MPD’s 
BWC policy is accessible on the MPD website.130 As mentioned in Chapter II, the District 
of Columbia’s Body-Worn Camera Regulation and Reporting Requirements Act of 2015 
requires MPD to publish BWC data every six months.131 In addition, every six months 
MPD collects, analyzes, and publishes a variety of BWC data. The bi-annual BWC report 
can be accessed on the MPD website by typing in “Body Cameras” and clicking on the link 
provided.132 BWC data from MPD bi-annual reports is depicted in Table 4. 













BWC recording hours 
collected? 4,554 Hours 25,021 Hours 47,409 Hours 86,011 Hours 
BWC technology 
failures 2 40 129 110 
IA investigations for 
officers failing to turn on 
BWCs 
4 23 103 89 
BWC video reviewed for 
other IA investigations 1 83 286 709 
                                                 
128 Metropolitan Police Department (MPD), “Metropolitan Police Department Annual Report: 2016” 
(report, Government of the District of Columbia, 2017), https://mpdc.dc.gov/publication/mpd-annual-
report-2016. 
129 “District Crime Data at a Glance,” MPD, accessed February 8, 2018, https://mpdc.dc.gov/ 
page/bwc. 
130 See https://go.mpdconline.com/GO/GO_302_13.pdf. 
131 “Reports on MPD’s Use of Body-Worn Cameras,” MPD, April 7, 2016, https://mpdc.dc.gov/ 
node/1116387. 
132 See https://mpdc.dc.gov/publication/reports-mpds-use-body-worn-cameras. 
133 Adapted from MPD, “Annual Report: 2016”; MPD, “Metropolitan Police Department Annual 














BWC video reviewed for 
IA citizen complaints 0 7 30 53 
BWC in use–Cameras / 
districts / special units 
126 cameras, 
7 districts, 
0 special units 
400 cameras, 
2 districts, 
0 special units 
1,242 cameras, 
10 districts, 
3 special units 
2,820 cameras, 
10 districts, 
9 special units 
Freedom of Information 
requested / released 
5 requests, 
0 videos released 
3 Requests, 
0 videos released 
18 requests, 23 
videos released 
35 Requests, 
9 videos released 
 
MPD’s published agency annual reports for 2013, 2014, 2015, and 2016 provides 
some limited data concerning citizen complaints against MPD officers, as shown in Table 
5. 
Table 5. Citizen Complaints against MPD Officers, 2013–2016134 
 2013 2014 2015 2016 
Type of Complaint     
Harassment 29 45 35 25 
Use of Force 34 28 37 16 
Discrimination 7 9 9 0 
 
D. FLORIDA—CAPE CORAL POLICE DEPARTMENT 
The Cape Coral Police Department (CCPD) publishes statistical data through a 
general annual report and an internal affairs annual report. According to the 2017 internal 
affairs report, the CCPD began deploying BWCs to first responders in 2015 and completed 
the distribution to all first responders by the end of 2017.135 CCPD does not provide a link 
to its BWC policy on its website, and a general open-source data search did not yield 
                                                 
134 Adapted from MPD, “Annual Report: 2016”; MPD, “Annual Report: 2015”; MPD, “Metropolitan 
Police Department Annual Report: 2014” (report, MPD, 2015), https://mpdc.dc.gov/node/1102842; MPD, 
“Metropolitan Police Department Annual Report: 2013” (report, MPD, 2014), https://mpdc.dc.gov/node 
/878852. 
135 “Cape Coral Police Department 2017 Professional Standards Annual Report,” Cape Coral Police 
Department (CCPD), 5, accessed February 5, 2018, https://www.capecops.com/publications/. 
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CCPD’s BWC policy. CCPD does provide citizens with the opportunity to ask general 
questions via the “Ask CCPD” link on the agency website, where the agency posts the 
citizens’ questions and CCPD’s answers. There is currently one question about the 
agency’s BWC program on the site: “Since the release of your body cameras have you had 
any issues with the function that causes your officers to dislike them?”136 Public Affairs 
Officer Corporal Phil Mullen provided a detailed explanation regarding the type of BWC 
CCPD uses, including the name of the camera and the manufacturer’s information about 
the functions of the camera.  
As previously stated, CCPD publishes annual statistical data. Table 6 shows 
CCPD’s complaints against personnel and use-of-force information for 2014 through 2017. 
CCPD’s 2015 annual report states that the Public Safety Advisory Committee discussed 
BWCs; however, the report fails to provide specifics.137 The 2016 annual report informs 
readers that 120 officers have been equipped with BWCs.138 The report specifically states 
that CCPD “will continue to refine our internal policies regarding their proper usage, to 
ensure we remain in compliance with legal guidelines, while meeting the needs of the 
community.”139 The 2016 internal affairs report further states: “It is believed that the 
Body-Worn Camera (BWC) Program, which was implemented in 2015, has attributed to 
the decreased number of citizen complaints and sustained dispositions when compared to 
2014.”140 In 2014, CCPD received forty-eight complaints against officers; in 2016, there 
were forty-six complaints. The report fails to mention that in 2015 CCPD received forty-
two complaints against officers, which reflects an increase in complaints in 2016. 
                                                 
136 “Ask CCPD #17: Lights, Body-Camera, Action!,” Cape Coral Police Department, accessed 
February 8, 2018, 12, https://www.capecops.com/blog/2017/5/19/ask-ccpd-17-lights-body-camera-action. 
137 “Cape Coral Police Department 2015 Annual Report,” CCPD, 12, accessed February 5, 2018, 
https://www.capecops.com/publications/. 
138 “Cape Coral Police Department 2016 Annual Report,” CCPD, 4, accessed January 5, 2018, 
https://www.capecops.com/publications/. 
139 CCPD, 4. 
140 “Cape Coral Police Department 2016 Professional Standards Annual Report,” CCPD, 6, accessed 
February 5, 2018, https://www.capecops.com/publications/. 
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Table 6. CCPD Personnel Complaints, 2014–2017 
 Complaints against Personnel Uses of Force 
2014 48 79 
2015 42 58 
2016 46 82 
2017 27 68 
 
The 2016 internal affairs report also reveals that CCPD is conducting reviews of 
BWC videos to identify situations where officers failed to act, which CCPD suggests have 
amplified risk of injury to arrestees and officers.141 According to the 2017 annual report, 
CCPD believes its BWC program “has significantly impacted the IA [internal affairs] 
process, both reducing the number of complaints taken, and ensuring accurate results of IA 
investigations.”142 
Open-source research did not reveal if CCPD has received or responded to BWC 
FOIA requests, nor does open-source data reveal information regarding CCPD committing 
BWC policy violations. 
E. NEVADA—LAS VEGAS METROPOLITAN POLICE DEPARTMENT  
LVMPD’s 2016 annual report states that the department began outfitting officers 
with BWCs in 2014; by the end of 2016, “LVMPD had completed the training and 
deployment of over 1,800 body worn cameras for officers who have daily operational 
interactions with the citizens in the community.”143 LVMPD does not publish the agency’s 
BWC policy on its website, but it can be found online via a Google search.144 
                                                 
141 CCPD, 11, 14. 
142 “Cape Coral Police Department 2017 Annual Report,” CCPD, 14, accessed February 5, 2018, 
https://www.capecops.com/publications/. 
143 Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department (LVMPD), accessed January 5, 2018, 
http://www.lvmpd.com/en-us/Pages/default.aspx. 
144 See http://ipicd.com/ceer/files/LVMPD%20BWC%20Policy.pdf. 
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LVMPD provides BWC information on its website, including information about 
how to request to view BWC video—whether in person, by telephone, or in writing.145 
The website further states that 
BWC recordings that are evidence in an ongoing investigation, judicial or 
administrative proceeding, are not public records until either the matter is 
concluded or, in the case of a criminal proceeding, the evidence is submitted 
in a public forum (filed with the court or submitted in open court)…. Such 
recordings will not be released until they become public.146 
The LVMPD’s “Use of Force Statistical Analysis 2012‐2016 Report” is accessible 
to the public via the website’s “Internal Oversight and Constitutional Policing.”147 The 
document reports that LVMPD’s “non‐deadly use of force incidents have decreased by 8% 
over the past five years.”148 This reflects a 42-percent decrease, from 1,345 non-deadly 
use-of-force incidents in 2008 (which was a ten‐year high) to 775 in 2016 (a ten‐year 
low).149 LVMPD also publishes an annual internal affairs report on its website; it covers 
the previous year only and does not provide any statistical analysis for the data. For 2016, 
the report was one page long and contained the total number of complaints against officers 
received in 2016 (there were 1,844 complaints).150 The report also provides a limited 
breakdown of the types of complaints—213 uses of force, 204 interactions with the public, 
195 standards of conduct, 166 neglect of duty, and 95 conformity to rules and regulations—
and the disposition of the complaints, but does not provide specific details regarding the 
complaint or what, if any, discipline was given.151  
                                                 
145 “Body Worn Camera Video Request,” LVMPD, accessed December 16, 2018, 
https://www.lvmpd.com/en-us/Pages/BodyCameraVideoRequest.aspx. 
146 “Body Worn Camera Recordings,” LVMPD, accessed December 16, 2018, 
https://www.lvmpd.com/en-us/Pages/BodyCameraVideo.aspx. 
147 See https://www.lvmpd.com/en-us/InternalOversightConstitutionalPolicing/Pages/Statistical 
DataandReports.aspx. 
148 “Use of Force Statistical Analysis 2012‐2016: Deadly and Non-deadly Use of Force,” LVMPD, 
26, accessed December 15, 2018, https://www.lvmpd.com/en-us/InternalOversightConstitutionalPolicing/ 
Documents/Use%20of%20Force%20Statistical%20Analysis%202012-2016%20-%20051117.pdf. 
149 LVMPD. 




F. SOUTH CAROLINA—GREENVILLE POLICE DEPARTMENT  
The City of Greenville Police Department (GPD) devotes a section of its website 
to BWC information.152 According to the website, the agency began broad implementation 
of BWCs in May of 2017.153 The first objective in GPD’s current strategic plan (also 
available on the agency’s website) is to build trust and confidence with the community 
through the development of internal strategies.154 BWCs are one initiative toward this 
goal, as a potential means to resolve disputed community interactions through transparency 
and accountability.155 
The homepage also contains a link to GPD’s BWC policy, which explains that GPD 
issues BWCs to “uniformed officers whose primary function is to answer calls for service 
and interact with the public (e.g., patrol, traffic, K-9, SRO), or officers who have a 
reasonable expectation that they will.”156 The policy directs sergeants to “conduct monthly 
random reviews of BWC footage captured by their assigned officers” to ensure that officers 
are properly using the BWCs and to single out events that may be of importance for 
training.157 However, I was not able to determine through open-source information if the 
reviews are being completed, or what has been found during the reviews. Citing South 
Carolina Freedom of Information Act (S.C. Code § 23–1-240(G) (1976, as amended), the 
policy informs residents that “BWC footage is not a public record subject to disclosure 
under the South Carolina FOIA.”158 GPD’s policy further states that “often times, public 
confidence and trust will hinge upon the release of records and video in a highly charged 
environment”; as such, GPD “will balance each of these interests in a timely and 
                                                 
152 “Body-Worn Cameras Project,” Greenville Police Department (GPD), accessed January 8, 2018, 
http://police.greenvillesc.gov/1180/Body-Worn-Cameras-Project. 
153 GPD. 
154 “Greenville Police Department Strategic Plan 2016-2021,” GPD, 5, accessed January 5, 2018, 
http://police.greenvillesc.gov/DocumentCenter/View/6653/GPD-Strategic-Plan?bidId=. 
155 GPD, 14. 
156 “Policies & Procedures,” GPD Organizational Chart | Greenville, SC - Official website, 2017, 
accessed January 08, 2018, http://police.greenvillesc.gov/1393/Policies-Procedures. 
157 GPD, “Body-Worn Cameras Project.” 
158 GPD. 
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responsible manner.”159 However, GPD does not provide any specific exceptions for the 
release of BWC video to the public.  
GPD’s Internal Affairs Division also publishes an annual report; the 2014, 2015, 
and 2016 reports are currently available on the agency’s website.160 The reports include 
complaints against personnel and of excessive force. Table 7 is a summary of GPD’s 
complaints against personnel and citizen complaints of excessive use of force. The current 
reports do not reference BWCs, nor do they explain how BWCs may or may not be 
influencing complaints against officers or use-of-force incidents; this may be because the 
department’s BWC program is so new (it has only existed since May of 2017). It is possible 
that information about BWCs may appear in the 2017 internal affairs report, but this report 
is not currently available on the website.  
Table 7. GPD Personnel Complaints, 2014–2016161 
 Complaints against Officers Excessive Force  
2014 26 7 
2015 36 6 
2016 29 6 
 
The next chapter provides an analysis of the data to determine if BWC information 
across the agencies is easily accessible, consistent, and relevant. The chapter also 
determines if the type, quantity, and quality of information meets Bauhr or Grimes’s 
metrics for measuring transparency: government openness, whistleblower protection, and 
publicity. Finally, Chapter IV makes recommendations to improve the consistency and 
release of BWC information and data moving forward. 
                                                 
159 GPD. 
160 GPD. 
161 Adapted from Denise R. Mapp, “Greenville Police Department 2014 Internal Affairs 
Investigations Summary Report” (report, Greenville Police Department, 2015), www.greenvillesc.gov/ 
533/Reports; Denise R. Mapp, “2015 Internal Affairs Investigations Summary Report” (report, Greenville 
Police Department, 2016), www.greenvillesc.gov/533/Reports; Denise R. Mapp, “2016 Internal Affairs 
Investigations Summary Report” (report, Greenville Police Department, 2017), www.greenvillesc.gov/ 
533/Reports. 
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IV. DATA ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. DATA ANALYSIS 
Table 8 provides a snapshot of the data gathered to answer the ten questions posed 
earlier in the thesis.  
Table 8. Data Variables Summary 












BWC policy online X N/A X X  X 80% 
Officers required 
to wear BWC X N/A X X X X 100% 
BWC deployment 
information  X N/A X X X X 100% 
BWC technology 
failures   N/A X    20% 
Officer failure to 
turn on BWC  N/A X  N  20% 
Quality assurance 
data online  N/A X    20% 
FOIA requests & 
dispositions  N/A X    20% 
BWC video 
released to public  N/A X X X  60% 
Complete annual 
complaints against 
personnel & use of 
force data available 
to public 
X N/A X X X X 100% 
Annual complaints 
against personnel 
& use of force data 
posted online 
X N/A X X X X 100% 
 
An analysis of the results reveals that, of the five police agencies examined, 80 
percent of the agencies post their BWC policy online or make the policy easily available 
to the public. CCPD’s BWC policy was the only policy not posted online or uncovered 
during an open-source search. 
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The research also revealed that 100 percent of the agencies require, at a minimum, 
that uniformed officers and their supervisors wear BWCs. Additionally, several of the 
agencies have BWC provisions in their policies for non-uniformed officers (e.g., detectives 
and undercover officers). Those provisions state that a detective may wear BWCs when 
gathering evidence or conducting interviews. The provision prohibits officers conducting 
undercover or sensitive investigation from wearing BWCs. 
All five of the agencies examined in this study provide general BWC “deployment” 
information to the public. The deployment information usually only addresses how many 
BWCs have been issued. MPD is the only agency that describes exactly how many BWCs 
were deployed in each district and specialty unit. In addition, MPD provides information 
regarding the total number of BWC recording hours collected agency-wide. This 
information is posted on MPD’s website every six months. MPD is also the only agency 
that provides statistical data regarding: 
• How many BWC technology failures the agency experienced over a 
specific period of time 
• How many times officers failed to turn on their BWCs in violation of 
policy 
• Specific quality assurance examinations and the results of those 
examinations  
• The total number of BWC FOIA requests the agency received over a 
specific period of time and the dispositions of the FOIA requests 
MPD, LVMPD, and CCPD have provisions in their BWC policies that permit the 
release of BWC video record; however, each policy includes restrictions and/or caveats 
regarding the release of the videos. Those restrictions/caveats include:  
• BWC recordings may not be released if they are considered evidence in an 
ongoing investigation 
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• BWC recordings of juveniles, sexual assault, child abuse, or other 
vulnerable abuse investigations may not be released 
• BWC recordings may only be released with the permission of the chief of 
police, or his or her designee 
As previously stated, GPD informs its South Carolina residents that “BWC footage is not 
a public record subject to disclosure under the South Carolina FOIA.”162 BART does not 
specifically mention releasing BWC video to the media or the public, but the policy 
addresses the release of BWC video to the “District Attorney’s office or court personnel 
otherwise authorized to review evidence in a related case;” and “independent BART Police 
Auditor or his/her investigator … with the expressed permission of the Chief of Police or 
authorized designee.”163 
The data also revealed that 100 percent of the agencies complete annual reports to 
detail complaints against personnel and use-of-force incidents, and each agency makes 
general data contained in those reports—such as the number of complaints received and 
the number and types of force used—available to the public online. Those reports also 
provide some statistical analysis of the data reported.  
B. TRANSPARENCY, ACCOUNTABILITY, AND TRUST  
I analyzed the data based on the transparency and accountability definitions, 
criteria, and research cited in previous chapters (Grimes, Bauhr, Ruijer, Bovens, and 
Covey). I then measured how each agency met the various transparency, accountability, 
and trust metrics established by those researchers. The examination seeks to answer the 
following questions: 
• Do the agencies share BWC data with the public? 
• Does the BWC data reach its intended audience? 
                                                 
162 GPD, “Body-Worn Cameras Project.” 
163 “Bay Area Rapid Transit Police Department Policy Manual,” BART, January 5, 2017, 
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• Is the BWC data balanced and forthcoming, does it acknowledge errors, 
and is it open to censure or disapproval? 
• Can the BWC data be analyzed, understood, and tracked? 
• Do the agencies highlight or withhold BWC data from the public? 
• Do the agencies solicit feedback from the public regarding the BWC data? 
All five agencies collect and share general and limited BWC data with the public; 
however, the amount and types of data vary from agency to agency. Whether the data 
reaches its intended audience is too subjective to measure. The data is released through 
open sources; however, some of the data is difficult to find. Individuals seeking the data 
may have to search through several sections of an agency’s website or may need to search 
for the information though other open-source avenues. 
All five agencies report, in general, that BWCs are deployed. However, MPD is the 
only agency that provides detailed information regarding exactly how BWCs are deployed 
monthly (and to whom), total hours of BWC footage recorded, BWC technology failures, 
officers’ failure to record BWC video per policy, BWC audit information, and training and 
disciplinary information. The other four agencies only provide general BWC information 
on their websites or through other open-source means. BWC and internal affairs software 
is available should agencies choose to aggregate and analyze such data. 
I found that agencies do highlight and withhold BWC data from the public. Each 
agency policy provided guidelines regarding if, how, or when BWC video is to be made 
public. However, it does not appear that communities have the ability to monitor their 
respective agencies—a problem that occurs when there is not enough reliable or consistent 
data.164 Without this ability, there is an increased chance for abuses, such as fraud and 
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waste.165 MPD was the only agency in the study that provided consistent and timely BWC 
data to the public, and MPD analyzes the data in an open forum.  
BWC technology and law enforcement BWC programs continue to evolve. Public 
outcry and industry support for transparency and accountability will continue the dialogue 
on the challenges and benefits of law enforcement BWC programs. The next section 
provides recommendations for how law enforcement agencies may provide consistent, 
timely, and accurate BWC data that meets the public’s needs. 
C. RECOMMENDATIONS 
The responsibility for establishing cooperative and meaningful police–community 
relations—built on transparency, accountability, and trust—is not an obligation solely of 
law enforcement. The International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP) recognizes that 
it is imperative for police executives to assume a leadership roles in moving this effort 
forward.166 In addition, IAPC stresses that chances of success are diminished if both sides 
are not willing participants.167 Police organizations can develop innovative programs, 
report data, and implement technology in an effort to improve transparency, accountability, 
and trust; but without public participation, these efforts are less likely to succeed.  
Bauhr and Grimes’s research on transparency concludes that the field is still 
plagued with conceptual ambiguities.168 The area of study lacks definitive concepts 
attributed to transparency and not linked as an attribute to good governance.169 They 
believe this is due to a lack of theoretical attention by academics. Furthermore, many 
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organizations that profess they are transparent lack robust internal audit systems, nor do 
they invite the public to contribute or to express grievances.170  
Esmael Ansari, director of government affairs at Axon, asserts that “the 
development of body-worn cameras for law enforcement created a new way to collect and 
manage evidence and provided a clearer avenue of transparency between officers and 
citizens.”171 According to the Implementing a Body-Worn Camera Program 
Recommendations and Lessons Learned report, many police executives agree and have 
expressed that “providing a video record of police activity, body-worn cameras have made 
their operations more transparent to the public and have helped resolve questions following 
an encounter between officers and members of the public.”172 Ansari notes that the 
implementation of BWCs in 2013 did not address issues of privacy due to a lack of 
legislation.173 Since 2013, however, statues and policies that direct the deployment and 
use of BWCs have been enacted by all fifty states and the District of Columbia, at all levels 
of government.174 In addition, numerous BWC research studies have reported variances in 
state statues concerning the release of public information, law enforcement BWC policies, 
BWC data aggregation, analysis and reporting, and the release of BWC videos. These 
inconsistencies have led to public outcry. 
Consistency is a critical characteristic of authentic leadership and a core component 
of transparency, accountability, and trust-building; yet consistency is under-utilized in the 
law enforcement profession. The law enforcement profession attempts consistency by 
implementing best practices based on research; however, best practices are only 
recommendations and do not mandate law enforcement leaders to act. Factors such as 
varying interpretations of best practices, political pressure, and state statues may cause 
inconsistencies in the implementation of law enforcement strategies and procedures.  
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The data analyzed in this thesis reveals that there is no consistent form of BWC 
data collection or reporting. Individual state statues set mandates requiring the use of 
BWCs by law enforcement agencies, and state and freedom-of-information laws govern 
the release of BWC videos recordings to the public; however, neither type of statute 
mandates or provides procedures for the collection, processing, production, release, and 
distribution of BWC statistical data. I further determined from the data that statistical data 
reporting varies; some agencies report no data, some little data, and some robust data. The 
District of Columbia’s police department is the only law enforcement agency in the study 
that provides robust and specific reporting of BWC data to the public. MPD is mandated 
by statue to report the data. The other four law enforcement agencies provide limited and 
vague information, even though those agencies are located in states that have laws 
governing BWCs and the release of information to the public.  
In general, law enforcement agencies are not meeting Bauhr and Grimes’s metric 
for transparency: government openness, whistleblower protection, and publicity. The 
limited and inconsistent release of BWC information does not reflect “openness” of 
government. I also found no whistleblower protection for those who may release BWC 
information, and BWC publicity frequently consists of the media reporting the police 
agency’s refusal to release BWC video.  
To overcome inconsistencies in data reporting, and to provide transparency, the law 
enforcement profession has developed incident-based reporting systems. Incident-based 
reporting systems provide large amounts of information that can be structured in intricate 
ways to reflect the many diverse facets of an incident.175 Incident-based reporting is also 
designed to accept consistent data from all participating agencies, and to provide easily 
accessible and up-to-date information for research, policy development, and strategic 
planning.176 Finally, incident-based reporting can help agencies complete annual or bi-
annual reports of aggregated and analyzed BWC data, which can be provided to the public. 
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The Uniformed Crime Report (UCR) and the National Incident-Based Reporting 
System (NIBRS) are two examples of incident-based reporting systems. “The UCR is a 
nationwide, cooperative statistical effort of nearly 18,000 city, university and college, 
county, state, tribal, and federal law enforcement agencies voluntarily reporting data on 
crimes brought to their attention.”177 The FBI administers the UCR program. According 
to the FBI’s UCR website, the UCR’s “primary objective is to generate reliable information 
for use in law enforcement administration, operation, and management; however, its data 
have over the years become one of the country’s leading social indicators.”178  NIBRS is 
an expansion of the UCR that “captures up to 57 data elements via six types of data 
segments: administrative, offense, victim, property, offender, and arrestee.”179 The FBI 
reports that it began receiving NIBRS data from law enforcement agencies in 1989. NIBRS 
has since expanded its information to include bias incidents, gang activity across the United 
States, thefts of cargo, and the assault and killing of law enforcement officers.180 
As a result of this research, I recommend the development of a BWC incident-based 
reporting system or the expansion of a preexisting incident-based reporting systems, such 
as NIBRS, to include BWC data. A BWC incident-based reporting system may be 
implemented at the local, state, or federal level. Advances in BWC software and police 
records management now include capabilities to document specific BWC data sets; the 
data can include the number of BWCs distributed to personnel by the division/district; total 
hours of BWC video recorded, BWC malfunctions, cross-references to police calls for 
service and BWC activation to assure proper activation of BWC, FOIA requests and 
disposition of those requests, and BWC video downloads/reviews and the reasons for those 
downloads/reviews.  
I further recommend that the District of Columbia’s Code, “Body-Worn Camera 
Program,” and its reporting requirements be examined and considered as the model for 






creating BWC reporting guidelines for other law enforcement agencies. The District of 
Columbia statute requires the MPD to collect data from its BWC program, and provide it 
to the public in an accessible format every six months.181 The statute also requires the 
MPD to report the number of hours of BWC recordings, the number of officers on duty by 
shift, as well as BWC failures for the same six-month period. In addition, mandated 
reporting includes the number of internal investigations initiated for failing to use a BWC 
during an interaction, as well as the number of recordings used for conducting internal 
investigations and investigating complaints. The number of BWCs assigned by district and 
police unit is also reported for the same time period. MPD must also report the number of 
FOIA requests, how the requests were fulfilled, and the cost analysis for fulfilling the 
requests. Reporting requirements further include the number of redactions and the type of 
incident captured by each BWC for defined categories of interaction.182 
BWC technology, policy, and practices will evolve; the pros and cons of BWCs 
will carry on in discussions and debates; and the public’s demand for law enforcement 
transparency and accountability will continue. Bauhr and Grimes claim: “A state may go 
to great lengths to make information accessible and publically available in a country in 
which citizens’ capacity to act on the information are low.”183 Timely, accurate, and 
consistent release of BWC data to the public may be the conduit for meeting the 
transparency, accountability, and trust concerns and needs of the public. 
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